

# Pipeline Safety and Efficiency

MARC Conference  
June 2009






Our aging infrastructure not only poses significant safety hazards, but can impact public health. What strategies and best practices can be used to improve our infrastructure?

or

Inadequately maintained infrastructure not only poses significant safety hazards, but can impact public health. What strategies and best practices can be used to improve our infrastructure?



# Pipeline Assets

- 36,500 mi of wholly owned natural gas pipeline
- Interests in an additional 4,800 mi of natural gas pipeline
- 250 Bcf of regulated natural gas storage capacity
- Average daily volume of approximately 15 Bcf
- 687 natural gas compressors
- Keystone oil pipeline 4,700 mi, 1.1 million Bbl/d


# TransCanada Pipeline System



Pre	% of System	Accum. Mileage
1950	3%	1200
1960	17%	6800
1970	37%	14700
1980	59%	24000
1990	72%	29000
2000	95%	37800
2010	100%	40000

Diameter	%
$x \leq \text{NPS } 10$	15%
$\text{NPS } 10 < x \leq \text{NPS } 20$	17%
$\text{NPS } 20 < x \leq \text{NPS } 30$	27%
$x > \text{NPS } 30$	41%
Total	100%


TransCanada Pipeline - Age of System




# US Serious Incident Details – Onshore Gas Transmission



OPS Onshore Pipeline Ruptures (98-08)




OPS Time Dependent Threat Ruptures (85-97 data)




# NEB Focus on Safety



NEB Ruptures (1984 - 2006)



Pipeline Age at Rupture



Cause	Average Time to Rupture	Shortest Time to Rupture	Total Ruptures
SCC	21	13	10
External Corrosion	30	22	13

Cause	Tape		Asphalt	
	Number	Average Time to Rupture	Number	Average Time to Rupture
SCC	7	19	3	27
External Corrosion	9	29	4	31

# Pipeline Integrity Threats




Nine potential threat categories (as per ASME B31.8S):

<b>Time Dependent Threats</b>	<b>Stable Threats</b>	<b>Time Independent Threats</b>
External Corrosion	Manufacturing Defects	3 <sup>rd</sup> Party Mechanical Damage
Internal Corrosion	Construction Defects	Incorrect Operations
Stress Corrosion Cracking	Equipment Failures	Outside Force


# TransCanada Rupture History




## Rupture History 1949-1984



## Rupture History 1985-2008



## TransCanada Cumulative Rupture Frequency



# TransCanada Pipeline Integrity Management



- **Comprehensive program and use of technology**
  - enhance pipeline safety
  - compliance with codes
- **Uses proprietary quantitative risk assessment process**
  - compliance with corporate safety risk tolerances
  - direct comparison of program costs to risk reduction benefits
- **Consistent approach for all Pipelines**

# Consistent Integrity Management Approach



- **Each line segment is different**  
Blanket approaches do not work
- **Maintenance programs need to be individually tailored for line segment**



## All threats can be managed

- Corrosion = ILI, ECDA, Hydrostatic re-testing
- SCC = HT, ILI
- M & C = Monitoring, HT
- Operations = Procedures, Training
- 3<sup>rd</sup> party damage = Integrated Public Awareness
- Geotechnical = Monitoring


The level of effort required is line segment specific



## Key concepts to Safe Pipelines

- Safety Culture
- Design, Construction, Operation
- Pipeline Integrity Plans, Processes, Procedures, People
- Know your threats & risks
- Mitigate your risks

# Questions?



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